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A B S T R A C T
Background: Health care workers (HCW) are at risk of infection during Ebola virus disease outbreaks and
therefore may be targeted for vaccination before or during outbreaks. The eﬀect of these strategies depends on
the role of HCW in transmission which is understudied.
Methods: To evaluate the eﬀect of HCW-targeted or community vaccination strategies, we used a transmission
model to explore the relative contribution of HCW and the community to transmission. We calibrated the model
to data from multiple Ebola outbreaks. We quantiﬁed the impact of ahead-of-time HCW-targeted strategies, and
reactive HCW and community vaccination.
Results: We found that for some outbreaks (we call “type 1″) HCW ampliﬁed transmission both to other HCW
and the community, and in these outbreaks prophylactic vaccination of HCW decreased outbreak size. Reactive
vaccination strategies had little eﬀect because type 1 outbreaks ended quickly. However, in outbreaks with
longer time courses (“type 2 outbreaks”), reactive community vaccination decreased the number of cases, with
or without prophylactic HCW-targeted vaccination. For both outbreak types, we found that ahead-of-time HCW-
targeted strategies had an impact at coverage of 30%.
Conclusions: The vaccine strategies tested had a diﬀerent impact depending on the transmission dynamics and
previous control measures. Although we will not know the characteristics of a new outbreak, ahead-of-time
HCW-targeted vaccination can decrease the total outbreak size, even at low vaccine coverage.
1. Background
Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced more than 26 Ebola virus dis-
ease (EVD) outbreaks since 1976. The largest of these, the 2013-16
West African outbreak, resulted in more than 28,000 cases in Liberia,
Sierra Leone and Guinea (World Health Organization, 2016). In this and
in many other EVD outbreaks there was higher incidence among health
care workers (HCW) than in the general population (Grinnell et al.,
2014; Matanock et al., 2014; Olu et al., 2015; Kilmarx et al., 2014; Khan
et al., 1999).
HCW are at high risk of infection from patients (especially before
introduction of personal protective equipment (PPE) (World Health
Organization, 2015)) due to their frequent and close contact with them,
for example during surgical procedures. Infected HCW may in turn
transmit the infection to co-workers or other patients (World Health
Organization, 2015). Nosocomial EVD outbreaks can also spread to the
wider community.
Mathematical modelling can provide insight into key epidemiolo-
gical drivers and anticipate the eﬀect of control measures (Kucharski
et al., 2015a; Camacho et al., 2014; Legrand et al., 2007; Kucharski
et al., 2015b; WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014; Merler et al., 2016;
Kucharski et al., 2016). Few models have investigated the role of HCW
in transmission, despite strong evidence of their importance during
outbreaks (Grinnell et al., 2014; Matanock et al., 2014; Olu et al., 2015;
World Health Organization, 2014; Drake et al., 2015). Understanding
the role of HCW in transmission is crucial to appropriately assess the
potential beneﬁt of HCW-targeted vaccination, so that appropriate
policy decisions can be made once an EVD vaccine is licensed.
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To evaluate HCW-targeted vaccination strategies, we used a me-
chanistic transmission model to separately estimate the eﬀect of HCW
and community members. By calibrating this model to observed pat-
terns of infection from prior EVD outbreaks, we could compare the
eﬀect of diﬀerent vaccination strategies.
2. Methods
2.1. Outbreak data
Information on the occupation of cases is rarely available (Rosello
et al., 2015), although this information is critical to determining the
role of HCW in transmission. We used data for outbreaks where we
could ﬁnd occupation (HCW or not) of cases. This resulted in twelve
timeseries drawn from local outbreaks during the West African epi-
demic, and from the large 1995 Kikwit outbreak in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) (Supplementary Section 1). We considered the
outbreaks during the West African epidemic as localised epidemics re-
sulting from imports in a given community and split the time series by
region. All twelve timeseries are provided in the supplement, and ﬁve
(for brevity) are shown in Fig. 1. We noted that the number, timing, and
dynamics of HCW infections during these outbreaks were not con-
sistent, and we therefore used the dynamics of HCW and community
infections to classify the outbreaks into types.
2.2. Classiﬁcation of EVD outbreaks into two types
We compared the HCW infection dynamics of the outbreaks and
determined that they fell loosely into two types. The distinguishing
characteristics we used were grouped into four categories: i) the pro-
portion of HCW and community infected through time; ii) the shape
and timing of the cumulative distribution of HCW infections; iii) the
weekly proportion of HCW infected; and iv) the total size of the out-
break in both number of cases and duration (Supplementary Section
S5). Data from Kikwit (1995, DRC) were uniquely detailed and there-
fore provided an opportunity to quantify the role of HCW in trans-
mission by ﬁtting a mechanistic model. According to our classiﬁcation,
Kikwit was a “type 1″ outbreak (described in Results), and therefore we
also calibrated the transmission model to the other observed outbreak
pattern: “type 2″.
2.3. Kikwit outbreak data
These data contained epidemiologically-inferred links between
cases, the occupations of both infectors and infectees, and daily gran-
ularity of symptom onset (Supplementary Section 2). The outbreak
started with infrequent cases in rural areas before introduction to
Kikwit General Hospital on April 7th (Fig. 1a) (Khan et al., 1999). On
May 2nd a haemorrhagic fever was diagnosed, on May 8th this was
conﬁrmed as EVD, and on May 10th international assistance was in-
itialised. Further control measures started on May 12th (Supplementary
Section S2). The ﬁnal case died on July 16th, resulting in 317 cases
reported, 248 deaths, and a case-fatality ratio of 78% (Muyembe-
Tamfum et al., 1999).
For each case we recorded patient occupation; the occupation of
their likely infector (obtained by real-time epidemiological investiga-
tions); date of onset; and date of recovery or death. There were some
missing data in each ﬁeld (Supplementary Section S2). We removed
cases with date of onset before April 7th, when the ﬁrst case was ad-
mitted to Kikwit General Hospital, which gave 284 cases, of whom 73
were HCW (26%). A likely infector was available for 191 cases. We
computed time series stratiﬁed by case and infector occupation.
2.4. Transmission model
We developed a deterministic compartmental model of EVD trans-
mission stratiﬁed by occupation, where individuals were either HCW
(h) or community (c) (Fig. 3). On infection, cases left the susceptible
compartment (S), and entered latent infection (E). The duration in E
was drawn from an Erlang distribution with shape 2 and mean ε−1
(King et al., 2015). Following E, individuals became infectious and
symptomatic (I), and recovered (R) or died (D). We did not have in-
formation about funeral transmission in Kikwit, and thus we considered
that all transmission events occurred from the I compartment (Sup-
plementary Section S3). For each occupation we deﬁned four time-de-
pendent transmission rates: βt,ij, where infectious, i, and susceptible, j,
are either c or h. We assumed a single introduction to each population,
and no population movement during the outbreak.
To account for the eﬀect of changing transmission rates, resulting
from control measures such as the arrival of PPE for HCWs, opening of
isolation wards, and population awareness of EVD, we used ﬂexible
time-dependent sigmoid functions for the transmissibility parameters,
βt,ij, for which we estimated the parameters (Supplementary Section
S3). The force of infection was =λ β I N( / )t ij t ij i j, , , where Nj was the po-
pulation size of HCW (900) or community members (200,000) in Kikwit
in 1995 (Supplementary Section S2).
2.5. Model ﬁtting for Kikwit outbreak
We ﬁtted the model to six time series of onset dates stratiﬁed by case
and infector occupation (Community to Community, HCW to
Community, unknown occupation to Community, Community to HCW,
Fig. 1. Incidence time series of EVD onset in ﬁve of the outbreaks used. Daily incidence in A) Kikwit (DRC 1995), B) Macenta (Guinea 2014), D) Conakry
(Guinea, 2014–2015) and E) Gueckedou (Guinea, 2014); C) Weekly incidence in Kenema (Sierra Leone, 2014). Bong County, Liberia is not shown here because the
data are infrequently reported making incidence estimation diﬃcult. Cumulative statistics are shown in Fig. 2 for Bong County.
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HCW to HCW, unknown occupation to HCW), and two time series of
deaths stratiﬁed by case occupation. Transition between the compart-
ments in the ﬁtted model is driven by continuous time diﬀerential
equations (Supplementary Section S3). We used a negative binomial
likelihood, Metropolis Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo (Roberts
and Rosenthal, 2009; Andrieu et al., 2003) and non-informative priors
(Supplementary section S4). We calculated the estimated time-depen-
dent reproduction number by occupation of infector and infectee (Rt ij, ),
and the net reproduction number (Rt n, ) using the next generation ma-
trix.
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2.6. Calibration of type 2 outbreak scenario
Data from available type 2 outbreaks did not include links between
cases, and therefore were too incomplete to ﬁt the same model fra-
mework. Observed type 2 outbreaks were characterised by a longer
time period of HCW infections with no early rapid increase, and the
epidemics were longer and larger in both occupation groups (see
Results and Fig. 2). We used published evidence to calibrate the type 2
scenario. We used initial HCW and community reproduction numbers
from a large study of transmission in Guinea (Faye et al., 2015), which
found low HCW-related transmission, and higher community-related
transmission. Contemporaneous analyses of the West African outbreak
suggested a pattern of initially sustained transmission in the commu-
nity, followed by a slow decline in transmission (Camacho et al., 2015;
Funk et al., 2017; Ajelli et al., 2015; Santermans et al., 2016). There-
fore, we calibrated the parameters of the sigmoid functions to give a
slow decrease in βt ij, . We computed the four reproduction numbers
between each occupation group using these published estimates for the
overall reproduction numbers. To fully quantify the uncertainty, we
used the parameter uncertainty from ﬁtting the Kikwit data. The
modiﬁcations we made to the transmission parameters (Table 2) re-
sulted in simulated outbreaks with higher community reproduction
number and slower transmission decrease in type 2 compared with type
1 outbreaks. We kept the same parameters for population size, number
of HCW, and reporting fractions as in Kikwit, which allowed direct
comparison of type 1 and 2 scenarios, and therefore the impact of
vaccination.
2.7. Simulation of vaccination
We extended the model to include vaccination of HCW and com-
munity and compared the impact of eight vaccination strategies
(Table 3). In order to observe the range of outbreaks generated by the
type 1 and type 2 scenario, we used a discrete-time stochastic variants
of our model, where the transition between compartments is treated as
a stochastic process and each individual has a probability of transi-
tioning (Camacho et al., 2014). We sampled 600 parameter sets from
the joint posterior distribution and generated 15 stochastic simulations
for each. The variance observed within each parameter set is due to the
stochastic transition process. We compared the number of cases and the
time to extinction (0 individuals in E and I) to the baseline scenario
without vaccination for each parameter set and random number seed.
We used the parameter uncertainty inferred from the Kikwit data for
both type 1 and type 2 outbreaks, and report 95% credible intervals in
the text.
We simulated ahead-of-time HCW vaccine coverage values of 50%,
30%, and 10%. These values reﬂect the high turnover of HCW in re-
cently aﬀected countries (Shoman et al., 2017; Petit et al., 2013), and
the possibility that protection could wane. Vaccine coverage should be
interpreted as eﬀective levels of coverage: 30% coverage is equivalent
to 100% vaccination of HCW and waning to 30% protection, or as 30%
vaccination and 100% protection.
Vaccination reduced susceptibility to infection (Fig. 3). For single-
dose vaccine, we used a hypothetical eﬃcacy of 90%, and protection
was reached after one week. For a 2-dose “prime-boost” vaccine, we
used a hypothetical vaccine eﬃcacy of 90%, where 80% was reached
one week after the prime vaccine, and the boost vaccine was adminis-
tered 28 days after the prime (Henao-Restrepo et al., 2017). Reactive
vaccination started with vaccination of unvaccinated HCW and
Fig. 2. Classiﬁcation of EVD outbreaks into two broad types. Dark grey marks the 95% credible intervals (CI) in type 1 outbreak simulations, light grey areas
correspond to 95% CI for type 2 outbreak simulations. Each colour corresponds to an outbreak, we used blue shades for type 1 outbreaks and red/purple shades for
type 2. A) Cumulative proportion of HCW among the total number of HCW infected through time. B) Weekly proportion of HCW among the total number of HCW
infected through time. C) Proportion of HCW among all cases infected at mid-outbreak. D) Proportion of HCW among all cases infected at the end of the outbreak.
Vertical lines in Figure C and D correspond to the value for each outbreak.
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continued until all HCW and 70% of community members were vac-
cinated, at the same rate for single dose and prime-boost vaccination.
We simulated vaccination of 1500 people per day, which was an op-
erational maximum suggested by ﬁeld teams.
In the type 1 scenario, reactive strategies began on day 20 (April
27th), which is when health authorities were alerted to an outbreak of
bloody diarrhoea in Kikwit (Muyembe-Tamfum et al., 1999). This was
earlier than detection of EVD because we assumed improved surveil-
lance and quicker EVD conﬁrmation in a contemporary scenario com-
pared with 1995. For type 2 simulations, early transmission was slower.
Low level transmission at the early stages of an outbreak can remain
unnoticed, therefore we did not think the duration since the ﬁrst case
was the ideal indicator for type 2 outbreaks. We started reactive vac-
cination when the number of cases was similar to the type 1 outbreak
on day 20, which was day 40 (median=53 cases in type 1, 38 in type
2). At 40 days, no simulation of the type 2 scenario had more than 100
cases. This is similar to the number of reported cases at commencement
of vaccination in the recent outbreak in Nord Kivu (DRC) (WHO,
2018a).
In ahead-of-time vaccination strategies of type 1 outbreaks the
number of exposed and infected HCW at the start of the epidemic si-
mulation were drawn from independent Poisson distributions with
means from the joint posterior. For type 2 outbreaks, epidemics were
seeded with 5 infected and 5 exposed community members
(Supplementary Section S4.5).
2.8. Sensitivity analysis
The type 2 scenario described above is constructed from published
parameter estimates, and implies that HCW have lower onward trans-
mission than community members. To explore this assumption, we
conducted a sensitivity analysis where HCW transmission mirrors the
transmission characteristics of community members, where both have
moderate transmission and a later time of decrease in transmission
(Supplementary Section S7).
3. Results
3.1. Classiﬁcation of outbreaks into two types
Using key characteristics of the HCW and community transmission
dynamics, we classiﬁed twelve localised EVD outbreaks into two broad
types (Fig. 2, Table 1, and Supplement S5). In both outbreak types,
HCW were at high risk of infection, however, in type 1 outbreaks there
was an early rapid increase in HCW incidence and in the cumulative
proportion of HCW infected. Type 1 outbreaks also had a higher total
proportion of HCW infected, shorter duration of HCW infections, and a
smaller total outbreak size. In contrast, type 2 outbreaks exhibited a
lower overall proportion of HCW infected, and a less obvious time
period of high HCW incidence, with longer period of HCW infections.
These outbreaks also showed a lower overall proportion of HCW in-
fected, and larger total outbreak size.
The outbreak types are broad classiﬁcations, based on a combina-
tion of features of the dynamics of HCW infections. By classifying
outbreaks in this way, we were able to determine the eﬀect of HCW-
targeted vaccination strategies under the range of observed transmis-
sion scenarios.
3.2. Fit of model to Kikwit data
Our ﬁtted model captured the dynamics of EVD in Kikwit (type 1
outbreak) for each route of transmission (Supplementary section S4).
We found that initial transmission from HCW was high (median
R0,hh=2.68, R0,hc=3.99) (Table 1 and Fig. 4). In contrast, the within-
community reproduction number was less than one, and therefore
transmission was not sustainable. Although there was low per capita
transmission from the community to HCW (median R0,ch=0.16), this
represents a considerable risk to HCW: on average, each eight com-
munity cases infected one HCW. Overall, the net reproduction number
at the start of the study period was 2.98 (2.11–4.36), with a major
contribution from HCW, despite their low number. The timing and
shape of the decrease in transmission depended on the occupation of
cases (Fig. 4 and Table 1). We inferred an early and rapid decrease in
HCW-related transmission, however we found that within-community
transmission decreased several weeks later. The net reproduction
number fell below one after 30 (27–35) days (Fig. 4c). Stochastic si-
mulations of the type 1 scenario resulted in 288 (180–406) cases (ob-
served value= 284), and the ﬁnal case was reported on day 115
(93–155) (Fig. 5).
3.3. Comparison to type 2 scenario
Although it was not possible to ﬁt the model directly to a type 2
outbreak, simulations of the type 2 scenario resulted in similar char-
acteristics to those observed (Fig. 2), matching patterns of cumulative
proportion of HCW infected either through time or in total, as well as
characteristics of number infected at each stage of the outbreak (Sup-
plement S5).
As observed in the data, type 2 outbreaks were larger than in type 1
(839 cases (170–4473)) and the epidemics lasted longer (184
(149–229) days). In the baseline simulation, 70 (41–105) HCW were
infected in type 1 outbreaks (observed value= 73), whereas 56
Fig. 3. Schematic of the model structure.
We used a continuous time SEIR model with
the population stratiﬁed by occupation, so i
and j are HCW (h) or community members (c).
Individuals begin susceptible to infection (Si),
and on infection they enter an exposed class
(Ei) split by the route of infection (Eii, Eji).
There are 2 sequential E compartments so that
the duration of the latent period is Erlang-dis-
tributed with mean of 9.5 days (see Methods).
After the E2 compartments, individuals enter
the infectious compartment (Ii), and then die
(Di, average duration 10 days) or recover (Ri,
average duration 18 days). The force of infec-
tion, λ, depends on the route of transmission.
When vaccination campaigns are im-
plemented, susceptible individuals can enter
the prime (Vp,i) and boost (Vb,i) compartments,
and are then subject to a lower force of infec-
tion equal to 1-vaccine eﬃcacy (νp or νb).
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(5–263) were infected in the type 2 scenario (Fig. 5).
3.4. Ahead-of-time HCW-targeted vaccination strategies
These strategies had greater eﬀect on total outbreak size in type 1
scenarios, whereas reactive and combined strategies had greater eﬀect
in type 2 scenarios (Fig. 5). Impact of ahead-of-time HCW-targeted
strategies depended on the coverage achieved: 50% coverage of HCW
decreased the total number of cases in type 1 outbreaks (type 1: 121
(50–243), type 2: 813 (163–4245)). This strategy did not markedly
shorten the outbreaks. This strategy did decrease the number of HCW
infected in both type 1 and type 2 scenarios (Fig. 5b and e). At lower
coverage, there was less impact on total cases or duration, but there was
a decrease in cases in HCW. The eﬀect on simulated outbreak trajec-
tories is shown in Supplementary Section S6.
3.5. Reactive vaccination strategies
In type 1 outbreaks, this strategy was of limited beneﬁt either to the
entire population (Fig. 5a) or to HCW (Fig. 5b). In contrast, in type 2
simulations, vaccination substantially decreased the total cases, and
there were 297 (7–2843) fewer cases in the entire population. Of those,
43 (3–226) fewer cases were HCW. Few type 2 simulations generated
very large outbreaks with reactive mass vaccination (12% resulted in
more than 1000 cases). In both type 1 and 2 scenarios, the single dose
vaccine resulted in fewer cases than prime-boost, because of the time
Table 1
Characteristics of the outbreaks. 1 marks type 1, 2 marks type 2, and m a mixed or intermediate value. Thresholds are as follows: Total cases (1= 1–250,
mixed= 250–300, 2= 300+), Duration (1–99, 100–150, 150+), Time till 50% (1–24, 25–49, 50+), Time till 80% (1–44, 45–70, 70+), % HCW among total (15+,
10–14, 1–10), % at halfway by time (20+, 15–19, 0–14), Diﬀerence in % at halfway by time (7.5+, 5–7.49, 0–4), % at halfway by cases (20+, 10–19, 1–10),
Diﬀerence in % at halfway by cases (5+, 3–4,< 2). These values, together with the graphs showing the dynamics of infection were used to classify the outbreaks into
two broad types.
Total
cases
Duration Time from
ﬁrst to last
HCW
infected
Time till
50% of
HCW cases
were
infected
Time till
80% of
HCW cases
were
infected
% of HCW
among
total
infected
% of HCW
among
infected at
halfway (by
time)
Diﬀerence in
% HCW: total
vs halfway (by
time)
% of HCW
among
infected at
halfway (by
cases)
Diﬀerence in %
HCW: total vs
halfway (by
cases)
Classiﬁcation
Kikwit, DRC 2841 73 days1 45 days1 24 days1 33 days1 26%1 36%1 10%1 39%1 13%1 1
Bomi, Lib 801 90 days1 49 days1 16 days1 39 days1 8%2 8%2 0%2 11%2 3%m too few HCW
Bong, Lib 1581 104 daysm 39 days1 19 days1 32 days1 16%1 52%1 36%1 30%1 14%1 1
Margibi, Lib 3942 72 days1 58 days1 16 days1 40 days1 11% 20%1 9%1 17%m 6%1 1
Montserrado, Lib 10552 104 daysm 104 days2 55 days2 81 days2 8%2 17%m 9%1 11%2 3%m 2
Kenema, SL 7062 250 days2 236 days2 77 days2 112 days2 14%m 18%m 4%2 19%m 5%1 2
Conakry, Guin 4852 282 days2 260 days2 137 days2 174 days2 12%m 15% m 3%2 15%m 3%m 2
Coyah, Guin 2281 324 days2 207 days2 109 days2 172 days2 7%2 8%2 1%2 6%2 −1%2 2
Gueckedou, Guin 3172 332 days2 303 days2 71 days2 221 days2 3%2 4%2 1%2 5%2 2%2 2
Kissidougou, Guin 1181 42 days1 39 days1 23 days1 41 days1 4%2 7%2 3%2 5%2 1%m too few HCW
Macenta, Guin 6602 155 days2 136 days2 45 days2 127 days2 2%2 2%2 0%2 2%2 0%2 2
N’Zerekore, Guin 2291 168 days2 119 days2 118 days2 132 days2 6%2 4%2 −2%2 4%2 −2%2 2
Table 2
Values of the reproduction number, time of change in transmission, and shape of the decrease in transmission. Type 1 values are inferred from ﬁtting the
model to the Kikwit data. Type 2 values are based on values in (Faye et al., 2015) to simulate outbreaks. We used the values of the overall HCW and community
reproduction numbers RH and RC in (Faye et al., 2015), with the same credible intervals as RH and RC in the type 1 scenario. As type 2 outbreaks were characterised
by a low number of HCW infected, we set R ch0, and R hh0, to the value for R ch0, estimated in Type 1 scenario. We then deduce R cc0, and R hc0, from R hh0, , RH , R ch0, and RC.
Mean values and 95% Credible Intervals are given. Comparison of the R0 trajectories is given in Supplementary Fig. 5.2.
HCW to HCW Community to HCW HCW to community Community to community Overall
Type 1 scenario R0 2.68
(1.83-4.01)
0.16
(0.05-0.37)
3.99
(2.47-6.29)
0.70
(0.53-0.95)
2.98
(2.11-4.36)
Tchange (days) Th=30 (27-35) Th Th Tc=55 (50-62)
shape αh=2.20
(0.23-4.83)
αh αh αc=2.49
(0.21-4.86)
Type 2 scenario R0 0.16
(0.05-0.37)
0.16
(0.05-0.37)
0.53
(0.24-0.90)
2.11
(1.94-2.34)
2.15
(1.99-2.37)
Tchange (days) Tc=125 (118-133) Tc Tc Tc
shape αc=0.05 αc αc αc
Table 3
Vaccination strategies tested in this analysis. We considered the following:
i) reactive mass vaccination of the population, prioritising HCW, with a prime-
boost vaccine (strategy a), or a single dose vaccine (strategy b); ii) ahead-of-
time vaccination of HCW, with three levels of coverage: 10% (strategy c), 30%
(strategy d), or 50% (strategy e); iii) combined strategies of ahead-of-time
vaccination of HCW at three levels of coverage plus reactive mass vaccination of
remaining HCW and the community (strategies f, g, and h). We selected values
of coverage that were realistic given high HCW turnover in recently aﬀected
countries (Shoman et al., 2017; Petit et al., 2013), and the possibility of waning
of protection.
Strategy HCW ahead-of-
time coverage
HCW reactive
coverage
Community
reactive coverage
Vaccine
a 0% 100% 70% Prime-boost
b 0% 100% 70% Single dose
c 10% –
d 30% –
e 50% –
f 10% 100% 70% Single dose
g 30% 100% 70% Single dose
h 50% 100% 70% Single dose
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Fig. 4. Reproduction number trajectories used in simulation for type 1 (upper) and type 2 (lower) outbreaks. A and D) HCW-to-community reproduction
number (blue) and community-to-community (red) are given with mean and 50% and 95% CI. B and E) HCW-to-HCW reproduction number (blue) and community-
to-HCW reproduction number (red) decrease at the same time, Th. The horizontal line indicates R=1. In panel E, the HCW-to-HCW and community-to-HCW
reproduction number are equal, the two lines overlap. C and F) The overall reproduction number trajectories for Community members (dark grey) and HCW (light
grey), with 50% and 95% CI.
Fig. 5. Eﬀect of vaccination by vaccine strategy in type 1 (upper) and type 2 (lower) outbreaks. In type 1 outbreaks A) Number of cases in the entire
population, B) number of cases in the 900 simulated HCW, and C) time to extinction; In type 2 outbreaks the: D) Number of cases in the entire population, E) number
of cases in the 900 simulated HCW, and F) time to extinction. Boxplots show median value, rectangles mark 50% CI, and whiskers the 75% CI. Simulations without
vaccination are shown in grey, and each colour represents a vaccination strategy (Table 3): reactive mass vaccination with (a) prime-boost vaccine or (b) single dose
vaccine; ahead-of-time HCW vaccination only, with coverage in HCW of (c) 10%, (d) 30% or (e) 50%; ahead-of-time HCW vaccination plus reactive mass vaccination,
with coverage in HCW of (f) 10%, (g) 30% or (h) 50%. Decreased assumed vaccine eﬃcacy or increased interval between prime and boost vaccines would decrease
the eﬀect of reactive vaccination strategy a. We give the 75% CI due to high variation in the simulation sets, and 95% CI are given in the Supplement (S6.5) Note
diﬀerent y-axes.
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between the prime and the boost dose, although the diﬀerence was
small: 3 (-26-35) cases in type 1, and 19 (-109-235) in type 2.
3.6. Combined vaccination strategies
Combined strategies decreased the number of cases and shortened
the outbreak for all values of coverage. In the type 1 scenario, combined
strategies did not decrease the number of HCW cases compared with
ahead-of-time HCW vaccination, because reactive strategies began too
late to protect additional HCW. In the type 2 scenario, for all values of
HCW coverage, more than 80% of the simulations excluded the baseline
median (839 cases), and time-to-extinction was reduced. In contrast to
the type 1 scenario, the combination strategies provide extra protection
to HCW directly, because reactive campaigns are assumed to prioritize
HCW.
3.7. Sensitivity analysis on HCW-related transmission in type 2 scenario
The overall size of outbreaks in the sensitivity analysis was smaller
than in type 2 scenario parameterised to (Faye et al., 2015) because of
the lower total reproduction number (Supplementary Section S7). The
general pattern of eﬀect of diﬀerent vaccination strategies was the same
as the type 2 scenario, which gives conﬁdence in the generalisability of
our ﬁndings.
4. Discussion
We used as much information on HCW-related transmission as
possible to classify EVD outbreaks into two broad types: the ﬁrst, where
the infection is catalysed by HCW and community transmission is low,
was observed in Kikwit (1995) and some prefectures of Guinea and
counties of Liberia during the large West African epidemic (2013-16);
and the second, where there is high risk to HCW, but the epidemic is not
ampliﬁed by their transmission, was observed in other areas of West
Africa during the 2013-16 epidemic. We parameterised the type 1
scenario by ﬁtting to an exemplar outbreak, and the type 2 scenario
using published values for transmission between groups. This classiﬁ-
cation is not perfect, with some outbreaks exhibiting characteristics of
both types, but allowed us to explore the range of observed infection
dynamics relatied to HCW infections and quantify the impact of HCW-
targeted vaccine strategies in observed scenarios.
Using a mechanistic transmission model stratiﬁed by occupation
and route of transmission, we found that in type 1 outbreaks, ahead-of-
time HCW vaccination can have a large impact on the number of cases.
Direct protection prevented infection of HCW, but also decreased their
role in further spread. In these scenarios, where transmission is more
dependent on the health care setting and perhaps, therefore more
amenable to rapid decreases in transmission, there are limited addi-
tional beneﬁts of reactive mass vaccination, both in number of cases
averted, and the duration of the outbreak. Indeed, the model suggests
that ahead-of-time vaccination of health care workers, even at modest
coverage (30% immunised) is more eﬀective than mass vaccination in
response to outbreaks. Ahead-of-time HCW vaccination strategies re-
quire many fewer doses than mass vaccination strategies.
In type 2 scenarios, where within-community transmission is above
the epidemic threshold, and there is no early decrease in HCW-related
transmission, ahead-of-time vaccination of HCW could still provide
individual protection to HCW and had a modest impact on overall
transmission. However, reactive community vaccination (with or
without ahead-of-time HCW vaccination) is more eﬀective under these
circumstances as this contributes to reducing the reproduction number
below one.
In all modeled scenarios, ahead-of-time vaccination of HCW pro-
vided direct protection for HCW, and also decreased the number of
cases in HCW due to indirect protection. In this analysis, we used the
eﬀective vaccine coverage, because we could not distinguish 30%
protection of all HCW from 100% protection of 30% of the HCW.
Further information on the likely protective eﬀect of future vaccines
would allow more speciﬁc examination of this distinction.
Data from Kikwit (1995) provide uniquely detailed information on
likely source of infection and timing of symptoms. However, some data
were missing, and the suggested routes of infection may not be correct.
We did not consider transmission after death, or that some individuals
(such as carers) may be more likely to be infected, which could aﬀect
estimates of transmission rate.
When generalising our ﬁndings to the current context, diagnosis and
testing may now occur sooner than during the 1995 Kikwit outbreak. In
addition, the rapid change in HCW-related transmission may partially
have resulted from an increase in use of PPE. In the current context,
HCW may have more rapid access to PPE, or have improved awareness
of EVD, and therefore the change in transmission rate could be dif-
ferent. This would decrease the impact of HCW-targeted vaccination in
type 1 scenarios, and therefore our ﬁndings may be on the upper end for
ahead-of-time HCW vaccination.
We used data for all the outbreaks and sub-outbreaks within a larger
epidemic that had information on the occupation of cases. It is possible
that there is some misclassiﬁcation of occupation, or that the deﬁnition
of HCW changed from one outbreak to another, especially during the
long West African epidemic. Incorrect classiﬁcation could aﬀect the
reproduction numbers attributed to each group, although we do not
have evidence of systematic misclassiﬁcation. We conducted sensitivity
analyses on the number of HCW and found that it did not aﬀect the
ﬁndings of vaccine impact.
Our model framework could not test other potential vaccination
strategies, such as ring vaccination, because we did not track speciﬁc
contacts that individuals make. We assumed that individuals mix ran-
domly within occupation groups, with no heterogeneity within groups.
Despite this limitation, the general conclusions are robust to the precise
value of the number of HCW, and the transmission values we used.
Reactive HCW-targeted vaccination has been used during the 2018
DRC outbreaks (WHO, 2018b), however, reactive vaccination strategies
are logistically challenging. We incorporated delays into the model, but
better information on the time from notiﬁcation to vaccination would
improve estimates of impact. These delays could also be aﬀected by
community response to vaccination, where resistance, and slowing of
campaigns, could decrease vaccine impact.
Achieving ahead-of-time coverage may be challenging, due to high
rates of turnover of health care staﬀ, the large geographic area at risk of
outbreaks, and because the duration of protection is currently unclear.
However, strategies that target HCW in towns or cities nearby to an
emerging outbreak are a potential way of achieving ahead-of-time
coverage, as used in neighbouring areas of Uganda during the Nord
Kivu outbreak (Health UM of, 2018), at the same time as implementing
enhanced protective measures. Recent evidence suggests that HCW are
like to have high acceptance of EVD vaccines, although eﬀective cov-
erage of the workforce is moderated by turnover of staﬀ (Jendrossek
et al., 2019).
The categorisation proposed here is generated from a range of
characteristics of EVD outbreaks. Not all EVD outbreaks are of these
two types, since there are not always HCW infections (World Health
Organization, 2017). In those cases, HCW vaccination would likely not
improve outbreak control by decreasing transmission, although would
provide direct protection to individuals at risk. However, we explored
the impact of diﬀerent assumptions about HCW-related transmission
during sensitivity analysis, and found the general pattern of impact of
each strategy to be similar.
Much of the data are drawn from local outbreaks during the larger
West African epidemic, where a large number of interventions were
occurring at diﬀerent times and locations, and therefore care must be
taken when extrapolating to new outbreak settings. Nevertheless, these
local outbreaks exhibited diﬀerent HCW-related dynamics, suggesting
vaccine-led interventions could have varying impacts in diﬀerent
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locations.
It would be challenging to assign outbreak classiﬁcations in real-
time, because the division relies on some metrics available only after
the outbreak has ended. Further work could develop a classiﬁcation
system more suited to use in real-time. Collecting and publishing more
detailed information on occupation of cases and the route of trans-
mission in future outbreaks would greatly improve our understanding
of the epidemiology of EVD and the potential beneﬁts from control
measures targeted at diﬀerent transmission routes.
Although we do not know whether the next outbreak will be type 1,
type 2, or a mixed-type outbreak, ahead-of-time HCW vaccination de-
creased the number of cases seen in HCW in simulations of both out-
break types. Ahead-of-time HCW vaccination decreased the total
number of cases to a small degree in type 2 outbreaks, but had a larger
eﬀect on type 1 outbreaks, by indirectly protecting non-vaccinated
HCW and the community, even at modest levels of HCW coverage.
Supplemental reactive community vaccination strategies may be re-
quired to control outbreaks when within-community transmission is
intense, as seen in type 2 outbreaks. This analysis quantiﬁes the impact
of realistic and feasible vaccination strategies which may be im-
plemented in a future EVD outbreak.
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